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ARTICLES
Consumer Protection After the Global Financial
Crisis
EDWARD J. BALLEISEN* & MELISSA B. JACOBY**

Like other major events, the Global Financial Crisis generated a
large and diffuse body of academic analysis. As part of a broader call
for operationalizing the study of crises as policy shocks and resulting
responses, which inevitably derail from elegant theories, we examine
how regulatory protagonists approached consumer protection after the
GFC, guided by six elements that should be considered in any policy
shock context. After reviewing the introduction and philosophy of the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, created as part of the
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, we consider four examples of how consumer
protection unfolded in the crises’ aftermath that have received less
attention. Our case studies investigate a common set of queries. We
sought to identify the parties who cared sufficiently about a given issue
to engage with it and try to shape policy, as well as the evolving nature
of the relevant policy agenda. We also looked for key changes in policy,
which could be reflected in various forms—whether establishing an
entirely new regulatory agency, formulating novel enforcement strategies, or deflecting policy reforms.
The first of our case studies focuses on operations of the Federal
Trade Commission in the GFC’s aftermath. Although the Dodd–Frank
Act shifted some obligations toward the CFPB, we find that the FTC continued to worry about and seek to address fraud against consumers. But
it tended to focus on shady practices that arose in response to the GFC
rather than those that facilitated it. Our second case study examines the
Congressional adoption of a carveout from CFPB authority for auto
dealers, which resulted from strong lobbying by car companies worried
about a cratering sales environment, and the aftermath of the policy.
Here, we observe that this carveout allowed a significant amount of troubling auto lending activity to continue and expand, with potentially systemic consequences. Loan servicer misbehavior, particularly in the form
of robosigning, is the focus of our third case study. Although Dodd–
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Frank did not explicitly address robosigning, the new agency it created,
the CFPB, was able to draw on its broad authority to address this newly
arising problem. And, because the CFPB had authority over student loan
servicers, the agency could pivot relatively quickly from the mortgage
context to the student loan context. Our fourth and final case study is the
rise and fall of Operation Choke Point, an understandably controversial
interagency program, convened by the U.S. Department of Justice,
which, with the GFC fresh in mind, attempted to curtail fraudulent activities by cutting off access to online payment mechanisms. Here, we see
an anti-fraud effort that was particularly vulnerable to a change in presidential administration and political climate because its designers had
invested little effort in building public awareness and support for the
program.
The Article concludes with an overall assessment and suggestions
for other focal points for which our approach would be useful. The examples span a range of other domestic and global policy contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
A full decade has passed since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) triggered a
flood of foreclosures, crushed real estate and stock market valuations, and
destroyed a number of leading financial service corporations. Freezing credit
flows throughout North America and beyond, the GFC prompted a sharp economic slowdown, with the unemployment rate in the United States ticking up
over ten percent.
Crisis events that generate such substantial economic harms and attendant
social pain typically prompt wide-ranging policy responses from legislators,
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regulators, and other governmental officials. The GFC was no exception. In the
parlance of political science, the GFC represents a “focusing event” or a “policy
shock,” as described by one of us in a recent volume, along with Lori Bennear,
Kim Krawiec, and Jonathan Wiener.1 Attracting attention from the press, experts,
politicians, and voters, a policy shock prompts “policy autopsies,” governmental
explanations of what went wrong. Official investigations are undertaken by legislative committees, administrative agencies, interagency task forces, and/or independent commissions of inquiry, supplemented by the work of nongovernmental
organizations and academics. Often, such endeavors involve extensive factfinding and pursue careful analysis; always, they bear the mark of prior beliefs
and political calculations.2 In some cases, policy autopsies lead policymakers to
adjust their views about the nature of risks and revise their sense of how to balance conflicting policy goals. In others, decisionmakers perceive the benefits of
attempts to prevent future reoccurrences to be outweighed by the costs associated
with proposed reforms. Crises, and the policy autopsies they produce, may also
generate significant shifts in public opinion and influence stakeholders’ understanding of their longer term interests. All such aftershocks contribute to the nature of post-crisis policy responses.
Few policy responses happen instantaneously. Disentangling the influences on
the impact of a given policy shock takes some temporal perspective. Legislative
responses may call for administrative rulemaking to flesh out statutory directives,
in turn requiring fact-finding, initial policy drafting, public comment, higher level
review, and then revision and refinement. Although shifts in enforcement priorities may percolate quickly through government agencies, full implementation of
policy innovations often unfolds over months or years. Complicating matters further, new events, including political elections, inevitably reshuffle political and
policy calculations.
This Article offers a methodology for studying policy responses following a
large-scale crisis, whether financial or otherwise. Such efforts should take
account of the following elements:
1. the degree of consensus about crisis causes (narrative construction and
uptake);
2. the extent to which key institutions come to view the crisis as requiring fundamental shifts in policy priorities, either because of the perceived magnitude of harms, or adjusted estimations of the probabilities associated with
prevailing socio-economic risks;

1. See generally POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS,
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES (Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D.
Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017) [hereinafter POLICY SHOCK]. To say that crises often
generate policy responses by no means suggests that policy shifts must, or even typically, occur because
of crisis events.
2. See generally Thomas A. Birkland & Megan K. Warnement, Focusing Events, Risk, and
Regulation, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 107–28.
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3. the degree to which officials can draw on existing policy proposals that plausibly respond to the concerns raised by the crisis;
4. the degree to which reformers have to grapple with conflicting policy objectives;
5. the capacity of interest groups to flex their political muscles amid post-crisis
deliberations; and
6. when sufficient time has passed, the degree to which reforms are short-lived
or withstand the test of time.

In this Article, we apply this methodology to aspects of post-GFC American
consumer protection policy.3 In addition to fitting our scholarly interests,4 consumer protection was a key post-crisis issue that highlights the competing tradeoffs and dueling social policies that inevitably characterize regulatory responses
to a shock.
In the aftermath of the GFC, policymakers identified deceptive and unfair practices as significant contributors to the eventual instability in the American mortgage market and wider financial markets. But extensive reconfiguration of rules
and more stringent enforcement postures did not uniformly follow. This Article
explores four case studies of policy responses to the GFC that demonstrate the
importance of carefully tracing the policy fallout from any large-scale crisis
event. The wide-ranging policy ramifications of the GFC presented no shortage
of potential topics to examine. Our analytical framework could be applied to policy problems across institutions, including the legislative process, agency rulemaking, and adjustments to both enforcement priorities and strategies that draw
on longstanding laws or discretionary pockets of authority.5
Our case studies reflect this range of institutional contexts. With respect to
agencies, it is natural to select some topics that involve the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), given its central role in post-GFC consumer protection. Accordingly, the Article begins with a brief discussion of the CFPB’s creation through the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act, emphasizing how key elements of
3. Consumer protection includes efforts to combat fraud and misrepresentation. We refer to
consumer protection, rather than fraud exclusively, because practices extracting value from consumers,
rather than providing a square deal, operate on a spectrum that includes situations in which it would be
difficult to substantiate the traditional tort law elements of fraud, but nonetheless have “tricks and traps”
elements to them. The term “consumer” signals transactions primarily for personal, family, or household
use.
4. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF
(2017); Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer Financial
Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99 (2011) [hereinafter Jacoby, Dodd-Frank]; Melissa B. Jacoby, The
Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protections, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751 (2011);
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511 (2010); Melissa B.
Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2261 (2008).
5. Our analysis does not, however, seek to predict where in this chain of possible intervention
Congress will choose to allocate authority. For a study of that allocation in securities law, including after
the GFC, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435
(2017).
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the new agency’s design reflected widely shared perceptions of institutional
shortcomings—some longstanding, some sharpened by features of the GFC.
Because the basic design and early operations of the CFPB have received extensive attention, we focus on less-studied aspects of the CFPB’s scope, along with
two case studies primarily involving other agencies.
Dodd–Frank and the birth of the CFPB affected the responsibilities of an
agency of much longer standing: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Thus, another of our case studies focuses on a series of FTC enforcement
campaigns in the form of named “operations,” in response to deception.
Here, one sees an agency reconfiguring its antifraud priorities, but more with
respect to deceptive practices related to the widespread economic distress
triggered by the GFC than to the frauds that contributed to the crisis in the
first place.
For our CFPB-related case studies, we focus first on the carveout of automobile dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction and second on robosigning as it
moved from mortgages to student loans. The automobile dealer carveout demonstrates two key themes: the significance of policy trade-offs among competing post-crisis goals, and the capacity of cohesive and highly-connected
interest groups to shape post-crisis policymaking. By contrast, our examination
of robosigning shows how regulators can pivot quickly to apply crisis-related
lessons to seemingly analogous situations if they are given sufficient running
room to do so.
A final case study examines an expansive, economy-wide policy innovation by
federal agencies outside the glare of either legislative action or formal rulemaking: Operation Choke Point (OCP), an interagency initiative coordinated by the
United States Department of Justice. OCP aimed to deny fraudulent firms and
other businesses engaging in illegal activities access to online payment mechanisms, but that ultimately had a farther, and more controversial, reach. One sees
here an example of a hyper-aggressive expansion of regulatory power, following
regulatory inaction in the run-up to the GFC.
Each case study investigates a standard set of queries. We sought to identify
the parties who cared sufficiently about a given issue to engage with it and try to
shape policy, as well as the evolving nature of the relevant policy agenda. We also
looked for key changes in policy, which could be reflected in various forms—
whether establishing an entirely new regulatory agency, formulating novel
enforcement strategies, or deflecting policy reforms, as in the example of the auto
dealer carveout.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates the more detailed post-GFC
policy arenas that we have chosen to examine within the circumstances that led to
creation of the CFPB. Part II presents our four case studies, contrasting moments
of more modest post-crisis consumer protection efforts with those that demonstrated a greater willingness to flex regulatory muscles. Part III discusses the
implications of our analysis for post-GFC consumer protection regulation and
identifies directions for additional research.

818

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 107:813

I. THE CREATION OF THE CFPB
The creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, typically shorthanded as the CFPB, reflected widespread perceptions that failures in the market
for consumer financial products contributed to the GFC. Congressional architects
modeled the CFPB on an existing academic proposal principally developed by
now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, who argued that appropriate regulation of consumer financial products and providers depended on the dedicated focus of a
new, independent federal agency.6 A single regulatory body, Warren contended,
would curb financial institutions’ forum shopping of regulators while allowing
for more effective priority-setting and a holistic, cross-sector approach to consumer financial protection.7
The CFPB inherited oversight authority over units previously spread between
seven separate federal agencies, but also received new powers and responsibilities. By deliberate design, the CFPB took a consolidated, instead of a fragmented
and siloed, approach to consumer protection, making it a primary rather than incidental or residual mission as it was for other agencies before the GFC. The regulatory toolbox that Congress allocated to the CFPB was flexible; although the
enabling legislation offered some specific product or practice prohibitions, it also
relied on discretionary authority to fight against unfair, deceptive, or abusive
practices.8 Alongside rulemaking, marketplace monitoring, and articulation of
best practices for firms and education for consumers, Dodd–Frank authorized the
CFPB to engage in extensive enforcement efforts independently or together with
other federal agencies and state attorneys general.9 One of the CFPB’s first tasks
was to define the specific markets over which it had authority, including

6. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 16–18. The
behavioral economics case for the concept is presented in greater detail in Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). See also Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1060–61
(2016) (tying CFPB’s creation to Warren’s policy proposal).
7. See Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit Market,
reprinted in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 392 (Edward
J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (arguing for “a unitary regulatory authority with respect to
financial products” to address “the fractured oversight” of the current regulatory regime, which allows
for “financial institutions that do not like the regulations imposed by one agency [to] reincorporate under
a new charter – and a new regulator”).
8. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1021
(b)–(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012)).
9. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1096, 1106–12 (listing all public law enforcement efforts and
finding that most enforcement efforts involved collaboration with other law enforcement officers); see
also Memorandum of Understanding between Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Regarding Fair Lending Coordination (Dec. 6, 2012), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201212_cfpb_doj-fair-lending-mou.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Justice
Department Pledge to Work Together to Protect Consumers from Credit Discrimination, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-and-justice-department-pledge-to-work-together-to-protect-consumersfrom-credit-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/Z4BU-WU3S].
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consumer credit reporting, the provision of consumer credit, debt collection, prepaid credit cards, money transfers, debt collection, and debt relief services.10
As mentioned above, some distinctive features of the CFPB reflect longstanding critiques leveled at federal regulatory policy, including the weaknesses associated with diffused authority and agency designs predicated on multi-headed
leadership structures.11 Unlike agencies charged with writing many other kinds of
rules, the CFPB’s rulemaking is not subject to review by the White House Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, although it does face scrutiny under the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.12 To reduce administrative
bottlenecks and promote forceful decisionmaking on behalf of consumers,
Congress designed the CFPB on a single-director model, with funding independent of congressional appropriations, by establishing it within the Federal Reserve
System but mostly shielding it from the control of the Federal Reserve’s Board of
Governors.13 These features reflect legislative efforts to prevent regulatory capture, foster the development of internal expertise, and ensure decisiveness.14
These design elements also aligned closely with perceptions of the specific
failings of pre-GFC oversight and enforcement of consumer protection. To the
advocacy coalition that favored creating the CFPB, including consumer, labor
union, and civil rights groups and academics, the GFC underscored the shortcomings of fragmented regulatory authority and excessive influence of the financial
sector. On this theory, an independent agency with a clear and cohesive mission
was the ideal model to adopt and then enforce sensible standards around such
issues as loan disclosure requirements, contractual defaults, and avenues for consumer complaints.15 This point of view went hand-in-hand with attempts to “reinvigorate[] state consumer protection efforts by rejecting broad preemption
arguments that regulators like the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have
asserted in the past.”16

10. See Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Product and Service Markets,
77 Fed. Reg. 9592 (proposed Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090).
11. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
12. See CFPB SBREFA Panels, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/category/
advocacy-navigation-structure/cfpb-sbrefa-panels [https://perma.cc/5HPB-MN4R] (last visited Feb.
27, 2019) (noting that under the Act, the CFPB must conduct a Small Business Advocacy Review
panel). A supermajority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, also established in Dodd–Frank,
can set aside a CFPB rule, but only under circumscribed conditions relating to “the safety and
soundness of the United States banking system” or “the stability of the financial system.” See 12
U.S.C. § 5513(c)(3)(B).
13. See § 5491(a).
14. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 72–77 (2010) (describing goals underlying the CFPB’s creation and the
“compromise” it struck between two competing views).
15. See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 35–43 (2012) (discussing Bureau’s independence and justifications
thereof).
16. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, supra note 4, at 106.
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II. CASE STUDIES
The case studies we explore in this Part took place in the shadow of Congress’s
post-GFC determination, explained in Part I, that the CFPB should be a vigorous,
independent consumer financial protection watchdog. We begin with the impact
of that development on the FTC. After almost a century of sole responsibility for
policing deceptive practices in interstate commerce, the FTC had to share that
authority with a new agency. We then turn to two significant issues that helped to
define the CFPB’s regulatory scope: first, a legislative carveout that insulated the
country’s largest durable goods market—automobiles—from CFPB oversight;
and second, the CFPB’s willingness to respond robustly to the issues posed by
robosigning, first in home mortgages—ground zero for the GFC—and then in student loans. Our fourth case study examines an interagency enforcement campaign, Operation Choke Point, which pressed the limits of legitimate regulatory
authority in the hopes of constraining the sort of predatory behavior in online
commerce that had occurred in the pre-GFC mortgage markets.
A. FTC’S ANTI-DECEPTION OPERATIONS

The FTC’s antifraud responses to the GFC mostly involved its basic enforcement powers over deceptive marketing, which it has possessed since its inception
in 1913. Although much has been made of the FTC’s loss of responsibilities
under the Dodd–Frank Act, the FTC retained significant authority: monitoring
interstate advertising and other marketing practices; administrative rulemaking of
unfair or deceptive marketing in specific industries;17 and investigating allegations of deceptive marking and bringing enforcement actions, which could lead
to cease and desist orders, fines, and disgorgement orders.18 Over the last quartercentury, moreover, the FTC has deepened its links with other federal agencies
and state attorneys general. Since 1997, FTC enforcement staff has compiled consumer fraud-related complaints into a national database available to federal, state,
and local authorities, known as the Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN).19 The
CSN made it possible to identify patterns in the complaint data for use in shaping
enforcement priorities, often in conjunction with other agencies.20 Beginning in
the mid-1990s, the FTC has periodically dubbed specific antifraud sweeps as
“Operations,” each tagged with a code name conveying its subject matter.21

17. Congress delegated this power to the FTC in 1975. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING
MANUAL, ch. 7.2.2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/
ch07rulemaking.pdf.
18. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement
Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcementauthority [https://perma.cc/RYU3-KDJE].
19. See Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
consumer-sentinel-network [https://perma.cc/QYJ4-97BK] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
20. See id. (describing the basic purpose and functionality of the CSN).
21. See, e.g., infra notes 24–25, 32–34 and accompanying text (providing examples of subject matter
code names).
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With this background in mind, we apply our framework to fraud-related operations of the FTC. Since 2008, the FTC has participated in or led at least seven
fraud-related campaigns, framed in press releases as responses to the financial crisis.22 Only one, however—Operation Stolen Dreams, spearheaded by the FBI to
address the fraudulent origination of mortgages—related to events that precipitated the crisis.23 The other six, explained below, represented efforts to curb
deception of individuals in financial distress, often due to secondary impacts of
the GFC, including four campaigns aimed at schemes falsely promising job
placements or self-employment opportunities.24 The other two focused on offers
to help distressed homeowners, usually by dangling phony promises to assist in
foreclosure forbearance negotiations or to refinance mortgages for lower interest
rates and monthly payments.25

22. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Federal, State and Local Law
Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown Against Abusive Debt Collectors (Nov. 4,
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/11/ftc-federal-state-local-law-enforcementpartners-announce [https://perma.cc/R2ZC-R3CC]; see also Lesley Fair, Operation Collection Protection
Puts the Heat on Illegal Debt Collection Tactics, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 4, 2015, 12:45 PM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/11/operation-collection-protection-puts-heatillegal-debt [https://perma.cc/27Q8-HEZR].
23. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Results
of Broadest Mortgage Fraud Sweep in History (June 17, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force-announces-results-broadest-mortgage-fraud-sweep [https://
perma.cc/Z6QP-UA36].
24. Those four campaigns were Operation Short Change (2009), Operation Empty Promises (2011),
Operation Bottom Dollar (2012), and Operation Lost Opportunity (2012).
For more on Operation Short Change, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on
Scammers Trying to Take Advantage of the Economic Downturn (July 1, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2009/07/ftc-cracks-down-scammers-trying-take-advantage-economicdownturn [https://perma.cc/CP66-Y3FW]; see also FTC Goes After Recession Scammers with
Operation Short Change, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 16, 2009, 9:42 AM), https://www.consumerreports.
org/cro/news/2009/07/ftc-goes-after-recession-scammers-with-operation-short-change/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/7HDT-MYKH]; Jennifer Kerr & Associated Press Writer, ‘Operation Short Change’
Cracks Down on Scammers, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7979894&page=1
[https://perma.cc/VM6K-Z5QY] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
For more on Operation Empty Promises, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Steps Up
Efforts Against Scams that Target Financially-Strapped Consumers (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-steps-efforts-against-scams-target-financially-strapped [https://
perma.cc/C8DR-CDUQ]; FTCvideos, Operation Empty Promises: Job and Business Opportunity
Scams, YOUTUBE (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rI5Ur9e-FxA&feature=youtu.be
[https://perma.cc/C6PR-GYGK].
For more on Operation Bottom Dollar, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on
Con Artists who Target Jobless Americans (Feb. 17, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2010/02/ftc-cracks-down-con-artists-who-target-jobless-americans [https://perma.cc/AB74NVDP]; E4 Health, Bottom Dollar Job Scams, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/146441935 [https://
perma.cc/8W2F-5GYP].
For more on Operation Lost Opportunity, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight
Against Deceptive Business Opportunity Schemes (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftcexpands-fight-against-deceptive-business-opportunity-schemes [https://perma.cc/B5SF-29H6].
25. Those two campaigns were Operation Stolen Hope (2009) and Operation Mis-Modification
(2014).
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Two of these enforcement campaigns related specifically to FTC rulemaking.
Operation Lost Opportunity sought to give practical effect to a 2011 update to the
FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule, which mandated a one-page disclosure a full
week before the signing of any contract related to a self-employment scheme.26
Operation Mis-Modification aimed to enforce an entirely new 2011 FTC regulation, the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule, which more sharply
defined the responsibilities of mortgage brokers, real estate agencies, and other
firms when they offered “help” to heavily-indebted homeowners.27
The mix of institutional participants varied across the seven enforcement operations. Almost all involved the U.S. Post Office Inspection Service, which had
developed expertise in fraud investigations in previous decades.28 U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors and state attorneys general were also frequent partners. One campaign, Operation Mis-Modification, was undertaken in conjunction
with the new CFPB.29 In most instances, to complement administrative enforcement proceedings and criminal prosecutions, the FTC developed new public education campaigns, increasingly through social media channels and online
resources.30
Evaluating the full set of consequences of these antifraud efforts would require
assessing the deterrent effects of enforcement and the degree to which consumers
have learned important lessons from educational campaigns, each of which present significant evidentiary challenges. The vast majority of news coverage related
to FTC anti-consumer fraud undertakings simply summarizes information
For more on Operation Stolen Hope, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State
Agencies Target Mortgage Relief Scams (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2009/11/federal-state-agencies-target-mortgage-relief-scams [https://perma.cc/3FFN-SLYU].
Operation Mis-Modification was the combined effort of the CFPB, fifteen state attorneys general, and
other state agencies that resulted in charges against three mortgage relief operations and thirty-two
similar actions. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State Agencies Stop Phony
Mortgage Relief Schemes (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and
State Agencies Stop], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/07/federal-state-agenciesstop-phony-mortgage-relief-schemes [https://perma.cc/QYH9-9T7F].
26. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight, supra note 24.
27. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State Agencies Stop, supra note 25. Under
the MARS Rule, covered businesses are prohibited from charging advanced fees, advising clients to
cease communication with their lenders, and making misleading claims in marketing or advice tailored
to individuals. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE RELIEF SERVICES RULE: A
COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/
bus76-mortgage-assistance-relief-services-rule.pdf. In addition, covered businesses are required to
make certain disclosures, including a clear indication of all fees, a declaration that they are not
connected to any government program, a comparison of the full financial implications of any proposed
new loan as compared to current mortgage obligations, a specification of the consequences of a failure to
make monthly mortgage payments, and a note that clients have the capacity to walk away. See id.
Finally, businesses must also keep records of advertising and client communications. See id.
28. See BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 271–75.
29. See supra note 25.
30. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Chairman Issues Commissions 2011 Annual Report
(Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/04/ftc-chairman-issues-commissions2011-annual-report [https://perma.cc/5J6R-BMU4] (describing FTC education efforts, including on social
media and other Internet platforms).
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provided in FTC news releases—in some instances, only one news release
occurred for a given sweep—rather than in-depth journalistic reporting. As such,
it is not obvious whether a given campaign reflected strategic deployment of
scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources, or a summing up of enforcement
actions that had a similar character.
As noted, almost all of the FTC’s post-GFC operations focused on secondary
impacts of the financial crisis. The collapse in home values and steep rise in
unemployment and underemployment expanded the number of individuals vulnerable to classic advance-fee scams promising loan relief, business opportunities, or employment. The FTC’s enforcement campaigns, as well as its forays into
rulemaking, were triggered by increased consumer complaints resulting from the
post-crisis climate for profiting from socio-economic distress.31 Since 2014, the
FTC’s enforcement priorities have shifted in line with dominant consumer complaints, targeting duplicitous marketing of automobile loans,32 student loan
relief,33 and computer security protection services.34
The shock of the GFC, then, redirected FTC actions without significant expansion of statutory authority. The FTC took on a more aggressive enforcement posture, while deepening its long-developing engagement with companion antifraud
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. At the same time, its antifraud
efforts, as reflected in enforcement operations, were overall less proactive and
more reactive than those of the new, post-GFC consumer watchdog in
31. Indeed, one FTC Commissioner explicitly connected the agency’s increased “consumer
protection efforts” to “fall-out from the financial crisis,” while another described herself as “particularly
interested in ensuring that the Commission addresses scams designed to take advantage of consumers’
economic insecurity.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2010, at 8, 27 (2010).
32. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, Multiple Law Enforcement Partners
Announce Crackdown on Deception, Fraud in Auto Sales, Financing and Leasing (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/ftc-multiple-law-enforcement-partnersannounce-crackdown [https://perma.cc/82XS-UDCW] (providing an example of FTC enforcement of
Operation Ruse Control (2015)); see also Lesley Fair, Operation Ruse Control: 6 Tips If Cars Are Up
Your Alley, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2015/03/operation-ruse-control-6-tips-if-cars-are-your-alley [https://perma.
cc/24UF-2XTK] (same); Jim Henry, FTC “Operation Ruse Control” Strikes Again at Fine Print in Auto
Ads, FORBES (June 30, 2015, 10:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2015/06/30/ftcoperation-ruse-control-strikes-again-at-fine-print-in-auto-ads/#1468dbe516f4 [https://perma.cc/B3A39WLM] (same); Colleen Tressler, Operation Ruse Control, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO.
(Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2015/03/operation-ruse-control [https://perma.cc/
4Q5M-89MP] (same).
33. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, State Law Enforcement Partners Announce
Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-enforcement-partners-announce-nationwide-crackdown,
[https://perma.cc/S5JG-6KAJ] (describing an example of FTC enforcement of Operation Game of
Loans (2017)); see also Ari Lazarus, Got Student Loan Debt? Don’t Be Scammed, FED. TRADE COMM’N:
CONSUMER INFO. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/10/got-student-loan-debtdont-be-scammed [https://perma.cc/B7FS-VKKH] (same).
34. See, e.g., Lesley Fair, Operation Tech Trap Targets Tech Support Scams – and Offers Insights for
Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (May 12, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2017/05/operation-tech-trap-targets-tech-support-scams-offers [https://
perma.cc/W3GR-JB24] (exemplifying FTC enforcement of Operation Tech Trap (2017)).
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Washington, D.C.—the CFPB. Although the FTC characterized its efforts as
prompted by the GFC, the agency consistently stressed the need to respond to the
socioeconomic harms unleashed by that event, not an imperative to act based on
an analysis of what caused it.
B. AUTOMOBILE DEALER CARVEOUT

The first of our two case studies involving the CFPB considers a post-GFC regulatory path not taken in legislative politics. As Part I suggested, Congress
designed the CFPB in accordance with a distinctive vision of maximizing consumer protection while minimizing regulatory capture and other roadblocks experienced by other agencies. However, there is a significant gap in the CFPB’s
authority: it “may not exercise any rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement or any
other authority” over automobile dealers that are “predominantly engaged in the
sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles,
or both.”35 This carveout thus insulates car dealers from the reach of the federal
agency created to address practices found in a variety of consumer loan contexts,
including the credit sale of automobiles.36
The carveout might not be significant if car dealers had little to do with the financing of purchases. Dealers often originate the loans to buy the cars they are
selling, however.37 Even when car dealers sell loans to third-party financial institutions shortly after origination, financing is the most profitable attribute of the
car dealership business, more so than sales of cars, parts, or service.38 Although
35. Dodd–Frank Act § 1029(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a) (2012); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger,
Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 704–05 (2011). The
carveout itself contains a carveout for dealers that routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5519(b)(2)(B). “Buy Here, Pay Here” dealers, which offer older used cars to subprime
borrowers, “typically make, hold, and service all of the loans they finance in-house.” On Predatory
Practices in Subprime Auto Lending: Hearing Before the N.Y. S. Banks Comm., 2015 Leg., 201st Sess.
6 (N.Y. 2015) [hereinafter Stifler Testimony] (statement of Lisa Stifler, Policy Counsel, Center for
Responsible Lending) (emphasis added).
36. In 2013, the CFPB issued a guidance document explaining how it would address discrimination
against non-dealer lenders that acquire the loans. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO.
2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
(2013); see Press Release, CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup/ [https://perma.cc/R822295A]. But see S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (invalidating CFPB’s 2013 indirect lending guidance
under Congressional Review Act).
37. See DELVIN DAVIS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NON-NEGOTIABLE: NEGOTIATION DOESN’T
HELP AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND LATINOS ON DEALER-FINANCED CAR LOANS 9 (2014), http://www.
responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/auto-financing/research-analysis/CRL-Auto-Non-NegReport.pdf (relaying that approximately fifty-six percent of car buyers who use financing to buy a car
execute a retail financing contract with a car dealer); see also Arthur Delaney & Ryan Grim, How
Congress Gave Auto Dealers a Pass, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2014, 2:15 PM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/23/car-sales-subprime_n_5614047.html [https://perma.cc/S2UP-2K82]
(quoting observation of lawyer for Center for Responsible Lending that lenders and dealers are
“inextricably linked in the auto finance world”).
38. See Christopher Kukla, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Overview: Emerging
Issues and Trends in Auto Lending, Presentation at the 27th Annual Festival of Legal Learning
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not representative of all auto dealers in the United States, common forms of
deception practiced by less reputable dealers include interest rate mark-ups and
“loan packing.”39 The exclusion of dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction thus constitutes more of a regulatory crater than a modest carveout.40
How did this exclusion find its way into the Dodd–Frank Act? The legislative
maneuver was led by Representative John Campbell (owner of car dealerships
prior to joining Congress) who proposed an amendment to the House bill in the
House Financial Services Committee.41 Once it became clear that the amendment
would pass, some committee members quickly sought to switch their votes to
support the carveout.42 Congressman Mel Watt later proposed, but then

Sponsored by UNC School of Law 4–5 (Feb. 11, 2017) (on file with author) (citing 2015 data from the
National Automobile Dealers Association indicating that “41.9% of dealership gross profit came from
[finance and insurance]”). Dealers are also central to the “yoyo sale,” described by the FTC as “using
deception or other unlawful pressure tactics to coerce consumers who have signed contracts and driven
off the dealership lots into accepting a different deal,” such as a higher interest rate on financing. Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Los Angeles-Based Sage Auto Group with Using Deceptive
and Unfair Sales and Financing Tactics (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/09/ftc-charges-los-angeles-based-sage-auto-group-using-deceptive [https://perma.cc/
7GWV-5P6P].
39. Consumer Protection in the Used and Subprime Car Market: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John W. Van Alst, Staff
Att’y, National Consumer Law Center). Loan packing involves the addition of warranties, upgrades, and
the like, often bundled and marketed in terms of overall monthly payments rather than their impact on
the cost of the car. See Stifler Testimony, supra note 35, at 5. According to data from the Center for
Responsible Lending, African-American car buyers are disproportionately likely to have packed loans.
See Kukla, supra note 38, at 9.
40. The FTC retains some authority over the practices of car dealers. See Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, FTC Announces Sweep Against 10 Auto Dealers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-announces-sweep-against-10-auto-dealers
[https://perma.cc/498RSZ6P] (detailing “Operation Steer Clear,” FTC’s latest sweep against ten auto dealers and settlements
with dealerships in California, Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, Michigan, and Texas); see also FTC
Approves Final Consent Orders Involving Auto Dealers’ Deceptive Ads, N.C. CONSUMERS COUNCIL
(May 6, 2014), https://www.ncconsumer.org/news-articles/ftc-approves-final-consent-orders-involvingauto-dealers-deceptive-ads.html [https://perma.cc/EZU7-5ZWA] (same); Soldiers as Consumers:
Predatory and Unfair Business Practices Harming the Military Community: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 35–41 (2013) (statement of Charles A. Harwood,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (reporting various efforts
to protect service members from auto-dealer practices targeting them). In addition, in 2015, the DOJ
announced the settlement of its “first-ever” discrimination lawsuit against a “Buy Here, Pay Here”
dealership after the dispute survived a motion to dismiss. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S.
Justice Department and North Carolina Attorney General Reach Settlement to Resolve Allegations of
Auto Lending Discrimination by “Buy Here, Pay Here” Used-Car Dealerships (Feb. 10, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-justice-department-and-north-carolina-attorney-general-reach-settlementresolve [https://perma.cc/F2KW-4WQY].
41. See Delaney & Grim, supra note 37. There is no amendment number because this exemption was
added with the initial passing of the Act in committee.
42. See House Fin. Servs. Comm., Financial Services Legislation Markup, C-SPAN, at 40:10–41:15
(Oct. 22, 2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?289596-1/financial-services-legislation-markup&start=
2413 [https://perma.cc/3QE4-JZEK?type=image].
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withdrew, an amendment to limit the exemption.43 The bill containing the carveout passed in the House on December 11, 2009.44
Senator Chris Dodd introduced a companion bill in April 2010.45 It passed in
May.46 That bill did not contain the auto dealer carveout, creating the need to
resolve the matter in conference committee. Without much discussion, the Senate
voted in favor of submitting an instruction to senators on the conference committee to accept the House bill’s car-dealer carveout.47 The exception thus made it
into the legislation that President Obama signed in July 2010.
Two associations of automobile dealers took the lead in securing and then protecting the carveout throughout this process. One was the National Auto Dealers
Association (NADA). After the Senate instructed retention of the Campbell
Amendment in the conference committee, an industry trade journal described the
outcome as reflecting “a hard-fought victory for NADA over a powerful coalition
that included President Barack Obama, the Pentagon, senior Democratic lawmakers, military families, consumer advocates and civil-rights activists.”48 The
National Independent Automobile Dealers Association (NIADA), an industry
group representing about 20,000 used car vendors throughout the United States,
also prioritized the carveout, with much of the work undertaken by the lobbying

43. See 155 CONG. REC. 31,364–65 (2009) (statement of Rep. Watt). Under this amendment, the
dealer exemption would not have applied to:
(A) any motor vehicle dealer to the extent that such motor vehicle dealer engages in any financial
activity other than extending credit or leasing exclusively for the purpose of enabling a consumer to purchase, lease, rent, repair, refurbish, maintain, or service a motor vehicle from that
motor vehicle dealer; or
(B) any credit transaction involving a person who operates a line of business that involves the
extension of retail credit or retail leases involving motor vehicles, and in which—
(i) the extension of retail credit or retail leases is provided directly to consumers; and
(ii) the contracts governing such extensions of retail credit or retail leases are not assigned to a
third party finance or leasing source, except on a de minimis basis.

Id. For competing theories about the rationale for Watt’s withdrawal, see Susan Crabtree & Bob
Cusack, Office of Congressional Ethics Focuses on Auto Amendment Offered by Rep. Watt, HILL (June
16, 2010, 12:41 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/103449-ethics-office-focuses-on-wattsauto-amendment [https://perma.cc/H4QZ-9P26].
44. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009)
(introduced by Rep. Barney Frank).
45. S. REP. NO. 111-176 (2010).
46. 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010); see Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 35, at
695–97 (providing overall legislative history of the Dodd Bill, including distinctions between the initial
Frank bill and the initial Dodd bill).
47. The vote was 60–30. 156 CONG. REC. S4138 (daily ed. May 24, 2010); see Letter from Sante
Esposito & Michael Esposito, Fed. Advocates, Inc., to Mike Linn & Keith Whann, Nat’l Indep. Auto
Dealers Ass’n (May 28, 2010), http://www.niada.com/PDFs/Information/Legislative/FederalAdvocate
Reports/2010/May2010.pdf.
48. Neil Roland, Dealers Exempted from More Oversight as Finance-Reform Deal Is Reached,
AUTO. NEWS (June 25, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20100625/RETAIL07/100629912/1128 [https://perma.cc/M38V-3U5K].
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firm Federal Advocates.49 A Federal Advocates update from October 2009 highlighted its efforts from just that month:
� Met with Congressional staff to key swing vote members to educate them on
the bill and its effects on the Auto Industry and NIADA members in
particular
� Reached out to all [House Financial Services] Committee members[’] offices
and key staff to alert them to the upcoming vote and NIADA’s position
� Worked with NIADA staff and consultants to develop an ongoing approach
to [Dodd–Frank]
� Identified Democratic members that should be targeted for calls by NIADA
members
� Worked with staff members from Rep. Adler and Rep. Kosmas’ office to
secure their vote for the amendment.50

Barney Frank, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, recognized
the political power of car dealer trade groups, noting that “[t]he local auto dealers
are very popular in their districts.”51 Car dealers have characterized themselves as
“pillar[s] of the community, an important donor to the town’s nonprofits, and the
archetypical family business.”52 Although another trade group, the National
Association of Minority Auto Dealers (NAMAD), expressed support for CFPB
initiatives to enforce anti-discrimination law in car sales and lending much
later,53 NAMAD was typically aligned with NADA on CFPB issues during the
development of Dodd–Frank. In that time window, NAMAD focused its

49. Federal Advocates provided monthly legislative updates to NIADA from 2009 to 2010 detailing
its lobbying efforts. See Legislative Archive, NAT’L INDEP. AUTO. DEALERS ASS’N, https://www.niada.
com/legislative_archive.php [https://perma.cc/3AJF-SBQS] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). Federal
Advocates received about $100,000 from NIADA in 2009–2010. Lobbying Database, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php [https://perma.cc/4JNN-ZNY8] (select “Search database
by lobbying firm” and then search for “Federal Advocates”; then follow the “Federal Advocates” link;
then select 2009 and then 2010 from the “Year” drop-down menu).
50. Letter from Fed. Advocates to Mike Linn & Keith Whann on October 2009 Monthly Report
(Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.niada.com/PDFs/Information/Legislative/FederalAdvocateReports/2009/
Oct2009.pdf.
51. Ryan Grim & Arthur Delaney, The Cash Committee: How Wall Street Wins on the Hill,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/29/the-cash-committeehow-wa_n_402373.html [https://perma.cc/6SL8-AV9V]; see also Auto Dealers Near Financial Reform
Exemption, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2010, 11:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/auto-dealers-nearfinancial-reform-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/X3M4-AKEV] (“[T]he political clout of 18,000 auto
dealers scattered nationwide was too much even for President Barack Obama.”).
52. See Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and
the Auto Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 241 (2010).
53. See Letter from Damon Lester, President of Nat’l Ass’n of Minority Auto. Dealers, to Hon.
Maxine Waters (Apr. 23, 2018) (writing that Congressional override of CFPB’s indirect lending
guidance “will set a horrible precedent, sending a message that our government is not supportive of
diversity, nor willing to take action that will prevent conscious and unconscious bias”).
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advocacy (although without significant lobbying expenditures) on ensuring that
manufacturer winnowing of dealerships did not disproportionately affect minority-owned businesses and those seeking financial assistance.54
Consumer protection and civil rights advocates mobilized in favor of the establishment of the CFPB after the financial crisis, and also opposed the auto dealer
carveout. For example, the Center for Responsible Lending took a leading role in
these debates,55 joined by the Consumer Federation of America.56 Several dozen
partner organizations signed onto letters asking Congress “to ensure that all activities of auto dealers related to the financing of cars are fully included under the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.”57 Supporters of a
standalone consumer protection bureau did not want to sacrifice the proposed
agency over a standoff on auto dealers, however. Tradeoffs were inevitable—the

54. See Ramifications of Auto Industry Bankruptcies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 14–15 (2009) (statement of Damon Lester, President, National Association of Minority
Automobile Dealers). Many minority dealerships folded or were at risk of folding in 2009, and
NAMAD’s focus at that time seems to have been stemming that tide. NAMAD lobbied for federal
financial assistance for small minority-owned dealerships through direct lending from the Small
Business Administration, drawing on practices from the 1979 Chrysler intervention. See Avis ThomasLester, How Damon Lester Is Leveling the Auto Dealer Playing Field, EBONY (Aug. 12, 2016), http://
www.ebony.com/career-finance/damon-lester-namad [https://perma.cc/Y4ZK-QPML].
55. See Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 94 (2009) (testimony of Kathleen E. Keest, Senior
Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending). The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) is the
research and policy affiliate of a community development financial institution, the Center for
Community Self-Help. Id. at 2. CRL takes the position that federal oversight should be a floor, not a
ceiling, on consumer protection, leaving a role for state law enforcement. See id. at 13. A CRL policy
brief, for example, claimed “[t]here is widespread agreement that there should be no carveout for auto
dealers.” CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, AUTO DEALERS SHOULD PLAY BY THE SAME RULES AS
EVERYONE ELSE (2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/researchpublication/auto-dealers-should-play-by-rules.pdf (naming U.S. Department of Defense, Military
Coalition, Credit Union National Association, and Independent Community Bankers Association as
opposed to giving “auto dealers a free ride from CFPB’s consumer protection rules”).
56. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Military Groups and the Department of
Defense Agree–Consumer Financial Protection Agency Should Cover Auto Dealers (Apr. 22, 2010),
https://consumerfed.org/press_release/military-groups-and-the-department-of-defense-agree-consumerfinancial-protection-agency-should-cover-auto-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/3T4A-L76J]; see also
Overview, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., https://consumerfed.org/overview/ [https://perma.cc/QP2FDQDZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (“As an advocacy organization, CFA works to advance pro-consumer
policies on a variety of issues before Congress, the White House, federal and state regulatory agencies,
state legislatures, and the courts. We communicate and work with public officials to promote beneficial
policies, oppose harmful ones, and ensure a balance debate on issues important to consumers.”). CFA is an
approximately fifty-year old association of about 300 non-profit consumer organizations with the
expressed goal of advancing consumer interests through research, advocacy, and education. Id.
57. Letter from A New Way Forward et al. to Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S. House of Reps.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., et al., on H.R. 3126 Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Auto Dealer
Exception (Oct. 7, 2009). Signatories included the NAACP, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
National Council of La Raza, DEMOS, National Consumer Law Center Consumers Union, PIRG, and
Public Citizen. Id.; see also Letter from Consumer Fed’n of Am. to Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S.
House of Reps. Comm. on Fin. Servs., & Members of Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Oct. 21, 2009) (urging
Members of the Committee to vote “No” on the Campbell amendment).
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price of getting a consumer protection agency with teeth against Wall Street
actors might lie in exclusions for supposed Main Street actors.58
In other fights, such as over bankruptcy reform, unions such as the United Auto
Workers (UAW) have shared positions with consumer advocates.59 Not here. The
post-crisis period was marked by fear of collapse of the American automobile
industry and the loss of thousands of dealerships.60 Under such conditions, we are
not surprised that the UAW would decline to take positions counter to those of
the distressed auto industry.
The car dealer carveout was not the industry’s first success in obtaining an
exemption from significant national legislation. Dealers also have an exemption
from the Federal Arbitration Act; automobile manufacturers cannot enforce predispute arbitration clauses against dealers.61 Widely dispersed and politically
active, car dealers have been effective lobbyists at the state level as well.62 In the
aftermath of the GFC, car dealers successfully pushed for new legal protections
in about two-thirds of states.63 Dealers’ trade groups, coupled with the financial
services industry, are positioned to respond quickly to proposed state and local
regulations if they view those bills as harmful to their interests.64 This facility
reduces the odds that states will fill gaps in oversight of car dealer deceptive practices left by the CFPB carveout.
The auto dealer carveout takes on special significance in light of parallels
between car lending and pre-crisis home mortgages.65 The volume of car loans
58. As another example of a Wall Street–Main Street tradeoff, see Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, supra note
4, at 108–09 (discussing the complex exclusion for doctors and dentists provided in section 1027 of the
Dodd–Frank Act).
59. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 268
n.167 (2001) (citing congressional testimony of both the United Auto Workers and the National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys about the difficult problems individuals face that lead
them to bankruptcy); Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 498 n.73 (2005) (reporting that the United
Auto Workers testified in hearings on consumer bankruptcy); Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data:
The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1, 9 n.22 (reporting
involvement of United Auto Workers, along with the Consumer Federation of America and Consumers
Union, in providing a perspective on bankruptcy reform distinct from the consumer credit industry).
60. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 52, at 233. Many of these dealerships were terminated
notwithstanding the government intervention. See id. at 236 (listing number of dealerships by brand
and year).
61. See S. REP. NO. 107-266 (2002) (applying to franchise contracts).
62. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 52, at 234 (explaining that “car dealerships, and especially
local or state car dealership associations, have been able to exert influence over local legislatures,”
increasing costs and prices, particularly for Detroit’s “Big Three” car manufacturers).
63. See id. at 248.
64. See Letter from Danielle Fagre Arlowe, Senior Vice President, State Gov’t Affairs Am. Fin.
Servs. Ass’n, to Casey Adams, Deputy Dir. of City Legislative Affairs, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer
Affairs (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/
03/AFSA-comment-letter-NYC-secondhand-auto-rules.pdf (“[W]e believe the proposed disclosures
would confuse consumers and provide little additional consumer benefit.”).
65. See Andrew Haughwout et al., Just Released: Who Is Driving the Auto Lending Recovery?,
LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/08/just-
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exceeds the volume of mortgage loans,66 which, as is now well known, contributed significantly to the GFC. Lisa Stifler, Deputy Director of State Policy at the
Center for Responsible Lending, testified in 2015:
We are also seeing practices in the auto lending market that mirror those in the
mortgage market prior to the housing crisis. Risk layering—combining several
practices that increase the risk of delinquency or default—is increasing. The
size and length of loans continues to grow. Delinquency and default rates are
climbing in auto lending while falling for other forms of credit. One lesson we
hopefully learned from the crisis is to take heed of troubling data and act to
prevent needless losses and harms to consumers, not wait for them to occur.67

Much auto lending growth since the GFC has been subprime,68 and underwriting standards have eroded in the last decade.69 Features of subprime and “Deep
Subprime” loans include longer repayment schedules, higher average loan-tovalue ratios, and higher interest rates than other auto loans.70
Finally, it is worth noting that some of Dodd–Frank’s substantive reforms that
might have been useful in many loan contexts, including car loans, applied only
to residential mortgages, in light of Dodd–Frank’s heightened post-crisis focus
on that particular financial product. For example, Dodd–Frank amended the
Truth in Lending Act to require verification of income in most mortgage loan circumstances, thus prohibiting “stated-income” home mortgage loans.71 The prohibition does not apply to car loans, where the practice has become common.
released-who-is-driving-the-auto-lending-recovery.html [https://perma.cc/6SYE-WKMH] (providing a
recounting of this analogy by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); see also Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In a Subprime Bubble for Used Cars, Borrowers Pay Sky-High
Rates, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 19, 2014, 12:36 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/
in-a-subprime-bubble-for-used-cars-unfit-borrowers-pay-sky-high-rates/ [https://nyti.ms/2kgtGr4]
(drawing same analogy).
66. Stifler Testimony, supra note 35 (citing U.S. Census Bureau data). More than eight out of ten
people in the U.S. workforce use cars to get to their jobs. See id. (citing Federal Reserve Bank of New
York data); see also Gunjan Banerji, When Does Consumer Debt Become a Systemic Risk?, WALL ST.
J. MONEYBEAT (Oct. 30, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/10/30/when-doesconsumer-debt-become-a-systemic-risk/ [https://perma.cc/YH35-4ZYL] (reporting that U.S. consumer
loans “make up almost half of the global consumer debt growth” in the past decade, prompting notice by
ratings agencies and major U.S. banks); Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to
the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 435,
439 (discussing difficulties when rising household leverage and high levels of consumer debt defaults
are contributors to systemic financial crisis).
67. Stifler Testimony, supra note 35. According to CRL, the fact that cars can and do get repossessed
on much shorter timelines than residential home foreclosures increases the salience for overall systemic
risk. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, “RECKLESS DRIVING”: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SUBPRIME
AUTO FINANCE GROWTH 5 (2015), https://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/autofinancing/research-analysis/recklessdriving_implications_subprime_autofinance_growth.pdf.
68. See Stifler Testimony, supra note 35, at 2 (citing Experian Automotive data).
69. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 67, at 3.
70. See id. (reporting Experian Automotive data).
71. See Dodd–Frank § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012) (amending the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1631 (2006)). Stated-income loans are loans in which a lender or facilitator takes the
borrower’s assertion of income at face value without verification, and sometimes inflates the income of
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C. “ROBOSIGNING 2.0”72

Our second case study, also focusing on the CFPB’s anti-deception efforts,
looks at the CFPB’s actions in response to robosigning in the residential mortgage
market, a flashpoint during and after the GFC, and the student debt market.73
With respect to robosigning, we find that the open-ended nature of CFPB authority facilitates robust regulatory action for an agency ready, willing, and able to
use that authority. Indeed, Congress’s delegation of power, without a carveout of
key parties, enabled the CFPB to extend its regulatory efforts beyond the immediate crisis-related concerns that prompted policy responses.
Coined in the aftermath of the mortgage servicing crisis, the term “robosigning” has been used to describe various illegal practices in the mortgage industry.
We use it in this Article to refer to the systemic practice of signing mortgage
documents that attest to the validity of a company’s ownership of a mortgage
debt without actual knowledge or confirmation of the loan’s chain of title and status. At the peak of the foreclosure crisis, a series of legal cases revealed that some
robosigners executed unsubstantiated affidavits for the purposes of pursuing debt
collection and foreclosure even though they could not prove they had the legal
right to take those actions. For example, one robosigner later admitted in a sworn
deposition that “she [had] signed off on thousands of foreclosures in a month for
JPMorgan Chase even though she did not verify the accuracy of the
information.”74
the borrower (potentially without the borrower’s knowledge) to obtain financing. These practices made
consumers legally responsible for loans outstripping their ability to repay, increasing default risk. See,
e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a
Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 200 (2009) (identifying alternative nicknames for stated-income loans,
defining the terms, and how lenders shielded themselves from the rising risk); Deborah Goldstein &
Matthew Brinegar, Policy and Litigation Barriers to Fighting Predatory Lending, 2 N.E. U. L.J. 167,
184 (2010) (describing stated-income loans and associated foreclosure risk). See generally Diane M.
Standaert & Sara K. Weed, Secure Transactions: Restoring Our Communities with Responsible
Lending, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 71 (2009) (analyzing the origins of “the
foreclosure crisis” and suggesting “state-level policy solutions” to predatory mortgage market
practices).
72. Natalie Kitroeff, The Student Debt Collection Mess, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 8–14,
2015, at 45 (quoting Robyn Smith of the National Consumer Law Center).
73. Although we focus here on the comparison of mortgages and student loans, the CFPB has
brought a considerable number of robosigning-related cases against credit card issuers and general debt
buyers. See, e.g., CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad
Credit Card Debt and Robo-Signing Court Documents, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 8, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-47-states-and-d-c-take-action-againstjpmorgan-chase-for-selling-bad-credit-card-debt-and-robo-signing-court-documents/ [https://perma.cc/
HJ94-M9AZ] (discussing CFPB action against credit card company JPMorgan Chase); CFPB Takes
Action Against the Two Largest Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect Bad Debts, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takesaction-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/ [https://
perma.cc/D59S-NV9Q] (discussing CFPB action against debt-buying companies Encore Capital
Corporation and Portfolio Recovery Associates).
74. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Amid Mountain of Paperwork, Shortcuts and Forgeries
Mar Foreclosure Process, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206132.html [https://perma.cc/8HU8-Q9XT].
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Although we now know that mortgage robosigning was commonplace before
the GFC, Dodd–Frank did not address the practice explicitly because it received
little or no publicity until after the bill’s enactment.75 Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) Chair Sheila C. Bair remarked in October 2010 that federal
bank regulators only recently had become aware of robosigning.76 Although an
FBI investigation into the practice had begun in Florida before Dodd–Frank’s
enactment, the local office did not receive authorization from the Washington
office to accelerate its inquiry until later.77
In 2012, the National Mortgage Settlement imposed new foreclosure document
verification obligations, at least among the signatories to those consent decrees.78
These new foreclosure document verification obligations included numerous
requirements meant to ensure that affiants of foreclosure documents verified the
chain of title of the underlying debt.79 The Settlement also required that mortgage
servicers take steps to ensure the veracity (and presence) of all documentation
needed to prove existence and ownership of the borrower’s underlying debt when
seeking to foreclose on a mortgage.80
75. See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, Niche Lawyers Spawned Housing Fracas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304410504575560072576527604
[https://perma.cc/X8SW-MU29] (reporting on 2006 discovery by attorney that mortgage company
employee who signed off on his clients’ mortgage documents did not review the underlying loan
documents and routinely signed off on mortgages without required verification of documents); Debra
Cassens Weiss, How 2 Pro Bono Lawyers Uncovered ‘Robo-Signer,’ Halting Foreclosures in 23 States,
ABA J. (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_2_pro_bono_lawyers_
uncovered_robo-signer_halting_foreclosures_in_23_sta [https://perma.cc/PP2B-9BFE]; Cha & Dennis,
supra note 74 (reporting on sworn deposition of JPMorgan Chase employee that she signed off on
thousands of foreclosures a month even though she did not verify the accuracy of the information).
76. Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to Urban Land Inst. (Oct. 13, 2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2010/spoct1310.html [https://perma.cc/CZX5FJLL] (“And now we have the added concern that lenders may have been foreclosing on homes without
proper documentation. The ‘robo-signing’ of foreclosure documents is a serious matter for loan
servicers, homeowners, and the entire industry.”).
77. See David Dayen, Inside the Abortive FBI Investigation of Illegal Foreclosure in Florida, VICE (May
31, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvxajb/what-happened-when-the-fbi-investigatedforeclosure-fraud-in-florida [https://perma.cc/Z92S-Q8EJ] (reporting on investigation of Florida document
processing services, falsification of foreclosure documents, and signatures for major banks).
78. See Settlement Documents, JOINT STATE-FED. NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://
www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents [https://perma.cc/54MG-RHGU] (last
visited Mar. 9, 2019) (displaying consent decree documents that include new foreclosure documentation
rules); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach
$25 Billion Agreement with 5 Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and
Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-stateattorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest [https://perma.cc/5EMN-EL5U]. The New
Jersey Supreme Court issued its own rules on the matter earlier. See Administrative Order Directing
Submission of Information from Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Plaintiffs Concerning Their
Document Execution Practices to a Special Place, In re Residential Mortg. Foreclosure Pleading &
Document Irregularities, No. 01-2010 (N.J. Dec. 20, 2010), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/
2010/n101220b.pdf (ordering all banks and companies that filed more than 200 foreclosure actions in
2010 to submit evidence that foreclosure verification practices are sufficient).
79. See, e.g., Consent Judgment Ex. A at A-1, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv00361-RMC (D.D.C. 2012).
80. See id.
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Beyond the National Mortgage Settlement, the CFPB has been able to use the
tools afforded by the Dodd–Frank Act to tackle robosigning against mortgage
servicers.81 For instance, in September 2014, the CFPB and fifty state attorneys
general entered into a consent judgment with SunTrust Bank related to a host of
harmful servicing practices, including robosigning.82 Modeled on the National
Mortgage Settlement, the CFPB alleged SunTrust’s inadequate loan origination,
servicing and foreclosure procedures constituted violations of state and federal
unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws.83
More recently, observers have drawn analogies between pre-GFC mortgage
debt problems and student loan servicing.84 Academics flagged the potential for
similar problems in student loans as early as 2014.85 Robosigning is among those
parallels, now documented in news reports and litigation. Debt collectors and
debt buyers have sued student loan borrowers in state court without proper documentation to prove the right to enforce the underlying debt.86
In contrast to the insulation of auto dealers from CFPB oversight, the Dodd–
Frank Act did not carve out student loan servicers, leaving the CFPB free to use its
general legal and regulatory tools in response to student loan robosigning. For
example, the CFPB obtained a consent order relating to Transworld Systems Inc.’s
(TSI) widespread student loan debt collection practices that involved the hallmarks
of robosigning—false affidavits and filing lawsuits without any evidence that they
had the right to enforce the debt.87 The CFPB’s jurisdiction over TSI is

81. Sections 1031(a) and 1036 of Dodd–Frank empower the CFPB to take action against unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices against consumers. See Dodd–Frank Act §§ 1031(a), 1036, 12
U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536 (2012).
82. See Consent Judgment at 1–2, United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-1028 (RMC) (D.D.C.
Sept. 30, 2014).
83. See Complaint at 17, United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-1028 (D.D.C. June 14,
2014).
84. See Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student
Loan Debts May Be Wiped Away, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/07/17/business/dealbook/student-loan-debt-collection.html [https://nyti.ms/2vvroKs] (“Some
of the problems playing out now in the $108 billion private student loan market are reminiscent of those
that arose from the subprime mortgage crisis a decade ago, when billions of dollars in subprime
mortgage loans were ruled uncollectible by courts because of missing or fake documentation.”).
85. See Jamie P. Hopkins & Katherine A. Pustizzi, A Blast from the Past: Are the Robo-Signing
Issues That Plagued the Mortgage Crisis Set to Engulf the Student Loan Industry?, 45 U. TOLEDO
L. REV. 239, 240 (2014).
86. See Natalie Kitroeff, The Lawsuit Machine Going After Student Debtors, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/thestudent-debt-collection-mess [https://perma.cc/N2LD-N7C9]. This practice has gone on in the general
debt collection context for a lot longer. See Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar
Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 259, 271–72 (2011); see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 41, 44, 55 (2015).
87. See Consent Order at 2, In re Transworld Sys., Inc., 2017-CFPB-0018 (Sept. 15, 2017). See
generally Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Behind the Lucrative Assembly Line of Student
Debt Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/
business/dealbook/student-debt-lawsuits.html [https://nyti.ms/2jlqMpZ] (reporting that TSI has filed

834

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 107:813

not in question.88
Of course, robosigning has not been the only allegation of trouble in consumer
loan servicing. Here again, the National Mortgage Settlement played a role in
addressing some problems in that context.89 The Settlement imposed global servicing standards, beyond foreclosure document verification, designed to keep
more borrowers out of the foreclosure process.90 The Settlement required that
mortgage servicers notify borrowers of “currently available loss mitigation
options prior to foreclosure referral,” including loan modification options.91
Servicers also had to establish a “single point of contact” for struggling borrowers, which minimized the potential for communication issues and conflicting
information arising from dealing with multiple servicer representatives, while
reducing the risk that debtors would turn to predatory loan modification
services.92
When similar problems emerged with respect to student loans, the CFPB and
state attorneys general sued Navient, the nation’s largest federal student loan
servicer, for “illegally failing borrowers at every stage of repayment.”93 The complaint identifies servicing issues addressed in the National Mortgage Settlement;
Navient (and by all accounts, other student loan servicers) tends to steer borrowers into repayment options that are not the borrower’s best option.94
Borrowers also complained of receiving conflicting information from Navient
representatives,95 which, like mortgage servicing problems, can lead to student
loan defaults that would otherwise have been avoidable.
In summary, with regard to many consumer protection issues posed by deceptive loan servicing practices, the Global Financial Crisis cast a wider policy
shadow. Even though the architects of the Dodd–Frank Act did not legislate a
response to mortgage servicing problems like robosigning, the CFPB was nonetheless able to address mortgage and student loan servicing problems as they
emerged by drawing on its basic legal and regulatory toolbox.
more than 38,000 lawsuits within three years on behalf of single clients and many cases were flawed due
to robo-signing features).
88. Consent Order, supra note 87, at 6.
89. Although Dodd–Frank mandates income verification in mortgage lending, Dodd–Frank Act
§ 1411, 15 U.S.C. 1639c (2012), most mentions of mortgages in Dodd–Frank are in the context of
gathering data and refinements to foreclosure prevention programs to the two foreclosure programs
established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-334, §§ 101, 102, 122
Stat. 3765, 3767–70 (2008), both of which ended in 2016.
90. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, supra note 79, Ex. A at A-16.
91. See id.
92. See id. at A-21.
93. See CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every
Stage of Repayment, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: NEWSROOM (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navientfailing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/5XS4-AUBC].
94. See Complaint ¶ 4, CFPB v. Navient Corp., 3:17-cv-00101-RDM (M.D. Pa. 2017).
95. See CFPB Monthly Snapshot Highlights Student Loan Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU: NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbmonthly-snapshot-spotlights-student-loan-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/8WYP-JXTB]. As of June
2018, the case remained in the discovery phase.
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D. OPERATION CHOKE POINT

Our final case study, Operation Choke Point (OCP), demonstrates how a crisis
can prompt especially aggressive policy experimentation, even in the absence of
legislative mandates. This endeavor further demonstrates the vulnerability of
such post-crisis policy innovations to political counterattacks, especially when
the relevant bureaucracies do not build wider support and the initiatives run afoul
of the perceived interests of well-coordinated business groups.
In contrast to intentionally publicized antifraud enforcement initiatives by the
FTC and CFPB, OCP emerged outside the glare of legislative politics and press
coverage.96 It would not stay hidden for long, however, eventually attracting considerable public criticism from trade associations and Republican legislators,
among others.97 In many ways, this enforcement campaign represented a knockon effect of the GFC. Key leaders in the Obama Administration attributed the
crisis in part to a soft enforcement posture toward business fraud.98 The disinclination to tackle frauds in mortgage origination, despite stark warnings from the
FBI,99 received especially sharp criticism from academics, members of Congress,
and the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.100
To shore up the government’s anti-fraud efforts, President Obama established
an interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) soon after taking office in 2009.101 Convened by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the
FFETF drew on representatives from twenty-two other federal cabinet departments, independent commissions, and other agencies, as well as officials from the
offices of state attorneys general and local law enforcement.102 According to
then-Attorney General Eric Holder, this task force would not simply “hold accountable those who helped bring about the last financial meltdown.”103

96. In the Proquest database, which includes government documents and major newspapers, there is
no mention of Operation Choke Point until January 2014, more than a year after federal officials began
the effort.
97. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
98. See Shahien Nasiripour, Obama to Form Mortgage Fraud Task Force, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2012), https://www.ft.com/content/d1a34214-470a-11e1-85e2-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/QHJ6RR9B].
99. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT 2006 (2007), https://www.fbi.gov/
stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2006 [https://perma.cc/T9RL-RJV9].
100. See generally Brooksley Born, Financial Reform and the Causes of the Financial Crisis,
Keynote Address at the 2011 Am. Univ. Bus. Law Review Symposium: Law, Finance, and Legitimacy
After Financial Reform (Apr. 8, 2011), in 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2012); Ross MacDonald, Note,
Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419
(2012).
101. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123, (Nov. 17, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Att’y Gen. Eric Holder Launches Consumer Protection Working Group to Combat
Consumer Fraud (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-eric-holderlaunches-consumer-protection-working-group-combat-consumer-fraud [https://perma.cc/HL7C-5UJ2].
102. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009).
103. Sam Youngman, President Obama Creates New Task Force to Crack Down on Financial
Fraud, HILL (Nov. 17, 2009, 5:58 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/68123-obamacreates-new-agency-to-target-financial-fraud [https://perma.cc/5CEP-B434].
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Reflecting lessons learned from the GFC, the task force would “prevent another
meltdown from happening.”104
The FFETF assessed the threats posed by all manners of financial fraud during
the Obama Administration’s first term. This review led lawyers in the DOJ’s
Consumer Protection Branch to focus on the extent to which, as American commerce had come to rely on online commerce, fraudulent businesses greatly
depended on third-party processors to transmit customer funds.105 In doing so,
DOJ lawyers followed the lead of an Assistant United States Attorney in the
Philadelphia office, Joel Sweet, who had brought a series of criminal fraud cases
against payment processors.106 DOJ lawyers also observed that a relatively small
number of banks and credit card processors were responsible for a large fraction
of cyberspace transactions, including those involving consumer fraud. By 2012,
officials in the DOJ’s Consumer Protection Branch accordingly sought to prevent
deceptive practices by targeting the online payment mechanism rather than just
prosecuting consumer frauds after the fact.107 In essence, they saw the payment
mechanism as a “choke point” for access to consumer expenditures.
The resulting anti-fraud campaign, OCP, had two primary prongs. The first
involved tough-minded enforcement actions against a relatively small number of
specific financial institutions connected to fraudulent businesses, often triggered
by extraordinarily high consumer rejection rates for commercial banking transactions.108 A typical rejection rate ranges between 0.5% and 1.5%.109 When financial intermediaries reported return rates “exceed[ing] 30%, 40%, 50%, and even
85%,” anti-fraud officials viewed such data as not just “glaring red flags indicative of fraud,” but as “ambulance sirens, screaming out for attention.”110 Such
scrutiny took the form of vigorous investigations through subpoenas and other
means, and a smaller number of criminal and civil fraud proceedings, such as the
one that the DOJ brought against the First Bank of Delaware, which resulted in a
$15 million fine and forced the bank to close.111
The second prong took advantage of the shift in the regulatory environment
created by selective enforcement actions and relied heavily on moral suasion.
104. Id.
105. See Michael J. Bresnick, Exec. Dir., Fin. Fraud Enf’t Task Force, Office of the Deputy Att’y
Gen., Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Exchequer Club of Washington, D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force-executive-director-michael-j-bresnickexchequer [https://perma.cc/BEQ2-CW2P].
106. See Jeri Leigh McDowell, Comment, Insidious Design or Instrument of Progress: The MultiAgency Initiative to Choke Off Undesirable Businesses’ Access to the Financial World, 47 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 803, 809 (2015) (describing Sweet’s career and relationship to the origins of
Operation Choke Point).
107. Kevin Wack, Five Takeaways from Internal DOJ Documents on Operation Choke Point, AM.
BANKER (May 30, 2014, 4:51 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/five-takeaways-frominternal-doj-documents-on-operation-choke-point [https://perma.cc/AY32-ELWK].
108. See Bresnick, supra note 105.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Banks Faulted as Taking Role in Web Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2013, at A1.
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Working closely with regulators at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, lawyers at the DOJ’s
Consumer Protection Branch disseminated information about the warning signs
that should alert banks to fraudulent marketing by the firms that relied on them
for payment processing.112 Regulators also circulated an FDIC-created list of economic sectors characterized by a relatively high incidence of fraudulent marketing.113 After DOJ lawyers identified firms engaging in apparently deceptive
business practices or, in some cases, operating in industries likely to have high
incidences of fraud, banking regulators recommended that banks shun those
firms, out of concern for their own reputational capital.114 The presumption was
that “banks should endeavor not only to know their customers, but also to know
their customers’ customers.”115 Without such due diligence into the backgrounds
of those firms who used their payment platforms, banks ran a considerable risk of
“allowing some unscrupulous scam artist to be taking the last dollars of a senior
citizen who fell prey to another fraud scheme, and hundreds of millions of dollars
of additional proceeds of fraud to flow through their institutions.”116 Careful vetting by banks, FFETF leaders hoped, would significantly curb predatory behavior, including the type that had helped to cause the GFC, without excessive
expenditure of public resources.117
The activities associated with OCP continued through the remainder of the
Obama Administration. OCP-related investigations led the DOJ and other federal
agencies to issue more than fifty subpoenas to financial institutions and pursue a
handful of fraud cases against individual banks alleging they had systematically
facilitated consumer scams.118 As with the investigation into the First Bank of
Delaware, these cases also resulted in consent decrees that mandated multimillion

112. See Michael B. Benardo et al., Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment Processor
Relationships, FDIC: SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS - SUMMER 2011 (2011), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html [https://perma.cc/U276-CCZJ] (last updated
July 14, 2014).
113. The FDIC lists business types it considers at “high risk” of fraud, including providers of: payday
loans, pornography, escort services, firearms, home-based charities, credit repair services, credit card
schemes, pyramid schemes, surveillance equipment, lottery sales, lifetime memberships, travel clubs,
and money transfer networks. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. AUD-15-008, THE FDIC’S ROLE
IN OPERATION CHOKE POINT AND SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCTED
BUSINESS WITH MERCHANTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-RISK ACTIVITIES 7 tbl. (2015), https://www.fdicig.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/15-008AUD.pdf.
114. See Bresnick, supra note 105.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, The Economics of Workplace Drug Testing, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 707,
734–35 (2016); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Justice Department Inquiry Takes Aim at Banks’ Business
With Payday Lenders, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2014, 9:59 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/01/26/justice-dept-inquiry-takes-aim-at-banks-business-with-payday-lenders/ [https://nyti.ms/
2lKfauE].
118. See Richard P. Eckman et al., Update on the Short-Term Lending Industry: Government
Investigations and Enforcement Actions, 70 BUS. LAW. 657, 658 (2015); Silver-Greenberg, supra note 111.
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dollar settlements and revamped business practices.119 More generally, officials
pressured financial service providers to investigate their business customers more
closely. The resulting scrutiny caused scores of firms to lose access to online payment systems, including some that may not have been engaging in wrongful activity, significantly compromising their abilities to conduct business.120
As a post-crisis regulatory initiative, OCP bears some key hallmarks of bureaucratic entrepreneurship: policy innovation developed by unelected federal officials, drawing creatively on existing grants of authority and redeploying them,
with an experimental mindset, to address a thorny problem.121 OCP also mirrored
prior efforts to tackle business fraud. In the 1970s, for example, the Division of
Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to target
law and accounting firms that provided services to corporations that they suspected of violating the securities laws.122 This approach, SEC officials concluded,
would maximize the impact of scarce enforcement resources.123 Through governmental pressure, the SEC hoped to enlist these private gatekeepers in snuffing out
dodgy corporate practices before they harmed investors.124 A full century earlier,
officials in the Post Office Department had similarly fashioned the administrative
fraud order to combat deception in the mail order sector.125 Once issued, a fraud
order denied a firm access to the mails.126 These antifraud initiatives acted as de
facto de-licensing regimes, closing off access to some key channel of commerce.
OCP shared another feature with the postal fraud order regime, at least in the
latter’s early decades—a lack of due process. Before the early twentieth century,
the Post Office frequently issued fraud orders without hearings or notice, simply
on the basis of evidence supplied by postal inspectors.127 Similarly, businesses
confronting heightened scrutiny from banks or payment processors as a result of

119. See generally Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Developments in the Law
Affecting Electronic Payments and Financial Services, 71 BUS. LAW. 361 (2015) (reviewing OCPrelated enforcement actions and outcomes). Other financial institutions that faced OCP-related legal
action include Four Oaks Bank & Trust of North Carolina, Plaza Bank, and CommerceWest. Id. at
370–71.
120. For an example of a harmed business, see McDowell, supra note 106, at 828–29.
121. See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, at 1862–1928 (Ira
Katznelson et al. eds., 2001). The Director of the DOJ’s Consumer Protection Branch described OCP as
“born of experimentation and based on collaboration,” and as “continually being refined and developed
as we implement it.” Michael Blume, Dir., Consumer Prot. Branch, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Plenary Address to the National Consumer Law Center’s 22nd Annual Consumer Rights Litigation
Conference (Nov. 8, 2013), reprinted in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH
CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S “OPERATION CHOKEPOINT”: ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF
LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES? app.1, at 473 (2014), [http://perma.cc/F2SM-9SES].
122. See BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 324–25.
123. Id. at 325.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 128–39.
126. See id. at 131.
127. Id. at 213.
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OCP did so as a result of informal judgments rather than formal administrative
process.128
Due process concerns about both initiatives prompted stinging criticism from
affected businesses as inconsistent with democratic norms and the rule of law,
and as representing an instance of poorly designed regulatory overreach.129 With
regard to OCP, financial service firms and businesses in “high risk” sectors
wasted little time in lambasting the enforcement campaign. Third-party processors formed a trade association to offer guidance to members on avoiding regulatory scrutiny, but also to lobby Congress against OCP.130 Other groups that
represented business sectors singled out by the OCP as having heightened risks of
fraud, including gun dealers and payday lenders, joined the fray.131 The opponents of OCP found ready allies among conservative think tanks such as the
Heritage Foundation, and champions among congressional Republicans, who
called hearings to highlight what they viewed as OCP’s regulatory overreach.132
The House of Representatives also sought to literally choke OCP by cutting off
funding to the FDIC that could be used for this operation.133 Although some consumer organizations and the occasional elected Democratic politician defended

128. See Eckman et al., supra note 118, at 659–60.
129. For more on the critique of the fraud order process as ignoring requirements imposed by the rule
of law, see BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 209–24.
130. See ATMIA Capitol Hill Meetings Focus on “Operation Choke Point,” BUS. WIRE (Feb. 9,
2016, 7:05 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160209005338/en/ATMIA-Capitol-HillMeetings-Focus-Operation-Choke [https://perma.cc/3XUV-FHSH].
131. See Jonathan Shorman, Gun Industry to Kansas Lawmakers: Protect Us from Discrimination,
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Jan. 28, 2016, 11:32 AM), https://www.cjonline.com/2016-04-06/stub-1275 [https://
perma.cc/T5D8-NDZE]; Justice Dept. Tries to Quell Bank, Processor Concerns About Online Lending
Probe, AM. BANKER (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:06 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/justice-depttries-to-quell-bank-processor-concerns-about-online-lending-probe [https://perma.cc/SMB5-43NX].
132. See, e.g., The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Role in Operation Choke Point:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th
Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Rep. Duffy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations)
(describing the FDIC’s purpose through the OCP as “to choke off the business they don’t like from the
banking system”); Who’s in Your Wallet: Examining How Washington Red Tape Impairs Economic
Freedom: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 56 (2014) (statement of Rep.
Stivers) (“The Operation Choke Point really has me worried about the overreach of government and
government shutting down properly licensed State businesses with which they just don’t agree.”); The
Department of Justice’s “Operation Choke Point”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rep. McHenry,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (criticizing OCP as “employing an axe rather than
a scalpel” as part of a grander “game plan to circumvent the rule of law and Congress to achieve
ideological objectives”); Guilty until Proven Innocent? A Study of the Propriety and Legal Authority for
the Justice Department’s Operation Choke Point: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rep.
Bachus, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law) (describing the
businesses targeted by OCP as comprising a “very wide net” suggestive of “agency overreach”).
133. 161 CONG. REC. H3805–07 (daily ed. June 3, 2015) (approving amendment to defund OCP); see
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 119, at 371 (reviewing legislation relevant to OCP).
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the program, the anti-OCP advocacy coalition principally shaped public discussion of the initiative during that period.134
By creating a clear narrative of regulatory overreach through congressional
hearings and a series of research reports, the critics laid the groundwork for the
Trump Administration’s decision to end OCP in the fall of 2017.135 This termination, perhaps, was made easier by their ability to write on a mostly blank public
slate; OCP’s designers had invested little time and effort in building public
awareness and support for the program.136
III. IMPLICATIONS
The responses to consumer protection problems in the wake of the Global
Financial Crisis highlighted in our four case studies underscore the complex dynamics of crisis-driven regulatory policy, which defy simple theories of policy
reaction. We offer the following observations.137
The crisis radiated from an epicenter of residential mortgage finance, a
dynamic appreciated by key legislators and other policymakers. As such, the
most vigorous anti-deception policy responses focused on mortgages. This observation is borne out in statutory reform (creation of the CFPB and mortgage134. For a prominent Democrat’s rare effort to make the case for OCP, see Joe Sestak, Make Banks
Ask, Tell, TIMES-TRIBUNE (July 25, 2014), http://www.thetimes-tribune.com/opinion/make-banks-asktell-1.1724503 [https://perma.cc/QB5E-2E3V]. Coverage and discussion of OCP in The Washington
Post was typical: news stories from Danielle Douglas stressed Republican concerns and criticisms; Todd
Zywicki devoted a series of blogposts to covering attacks on OCP by conservative organizations. See,
e.g., Danielle Douglas, Republicans to Justice Dept.: Stop Targeting Legal Businesses in ‘Operation
Choke Point,’ WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
republicans-to-justice-dept-stop-targeting-legal-businesses-in-operation-choke-point/2014/07/17/
94cf6b9a-0dc0-11e4-8c9a-923ecc0c7d23_story.html?utm_term=.4fd1b8714afa [https://perma.cc/3YPBSSPZ]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Operation Choke Point: The Battle Over Financial Data Between the
Government and Banks, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2014/04/16/operation-choke-point-the-battle-over-financial-data-between-the-governmentand-banks/?utm_term=.96674b66ea10 [https://perma.cc/7C6M-BDFC]; Todd Zywicki, FDIC Retreats
on Operation Choke Point?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/29/fdic-retreats-on-operation-choke-point/?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.cf18f6de7534 [https://perma.cc/9ZLF-VU8D]; Todd Zywicki, Federalist
Society Teleforum on Operation Choke Point, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/16/teleforum-on-operationchoke-point/?utm_term=.47dbd851700f [https://perma.cc/43CT-9DBV]; Todd Zywicki, “Operation
Choke Point,” WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/24/operation-choke-point/?utm_term=.cd5abe18e65d
[https://perma.cc/FE7E-XNKL].
135. See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Bob
Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Aug. 16, 2017) (calling OCP a “misguided
initiative” and stating that “[w]e share your view that law abiding businesses should not be targeted
simply for operating in an industry that a particular administration might disfavor”).
136. The financial press did not cover OCP before the summer of 2013, and mainstream newspapers
did not follow suit until 2014. Eventual press coverage overwhelmingly stressed Republican complaints.
See, e.g., Peter Weinstock, Regulators Gang Up on Banks, Third-Party Payment Processors, AM.
BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug. 22, 2013, 9:44 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/regulatorsgang-up-on-banks-third-party-payment-processors [https://perma.cc/E999-GGVP].
137. For references to parallel analytical points, see POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 540–57.
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specific prohibitions and requirements in Dodd–Frank), the CFPB’s agenda-setting through rulemaking and other means, and FTC enforcement campaigns such
as Operation Stolen Dreams. Nonetheless, subsequent actions by regulators demonstrate recognition that deception arises, and requires redress, in a wider array of
consumer financial markets and circumstances.138 Despite the concentration on
reforming markets for mortgage origination distribution and enforcement, the
GFC cast a much wider shadow over anti-deception efforts in the federal government. Thus, political appointees at regulatory agencies made fraud monitoring
and enforcement a bigger priority. They deepened interagency cooperation and
networks, especially through the work of the FFETF, and were thus more readily
able to recognize emerging patterns of marketplace deception. As a result, they
could move relatively quickly to address post-crisis loan modification scams and
robosigning, which were directly connected to mortgage markets, business opportunity, and employment scams, which exploited widespread post-crisis financial distress, and emerging problems in markets such as student loans, which
resemble practices prevalent in the pre-crisis mortgage arena. Given sufficient
discretion and resources, post-crisis regulators had a greater ability to address
newly discovered problems and prevent regulating only in the rear-view
mirror.139
Directly in the aftermath of the GFC, the same congressional leaders and the
Obama Administration who viewed mortgage finance as rife with bad corporate
actors associated the GFC with fragmented and ineffective regulatory authority,
which diffused responsibility and stimulated forum shopping for sympathetic regulators. At the same time, those policymakers drew the lesson that regulation had
to pay more attention to consumer protection and systemic risk. Although these
narratives were not universally endorsed and skeptics continue to criticize them,
this framing of consumer protection issues encouraged a more vigorous and comprehensive policy response, particularly in the CFPB, which was premised on
institutional consolidation.
In the face of that strong policy preference for regulatory consolidation, industries seeking to deflect stringent regulatory oversight were incentivized to emphasize other priorities of crisis response. For example, the auto dealer carveout
gained bipartisan political support because it could be seen as supporting the
domestic automobile industry, which had cratered amid the economic downturn,
as well as the wider imperative of stabilizing employment and laying the groundwork for economic recovery.

138. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1091–92 (“Deception was by far the most common legal violation
asserted in CFPB public enforcement actions to date. . . . Cases pleading deception generated . . . about
93% of all consumer relief awarded in public Bureau actions.”). Anti-deception actions included a
significant number enforcing the FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule. Id. at 1092 tbl.8.
139. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 66, at 436 (“The outcome should be that policy-making
takes a more ‘Bayesian’ approach where reforms are implemented in areas where knowledge is greater,
while in other areas both a more ‘experimental’ approach is taken and more resources – data, analyses –
are invested to clarify the best approach.”).
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Although the CFPB has ordinarily been cautious in exercising its authority
(notwithstanding critics’ claims otherwise),140 attention to business fraud and
heightened appreciation for regulatory discretion prompted other aggressive bureaucratic innovation, most notably Operation Choke Point. That innovation
sometimes undermined key policy values like procedural protections for regulated entities, a key element in the eventually successful effort to end OCP.
A further point worth emphasis involves the contested nature of post-crisis policy autopsies, and their susceptibility to revision with subsequent political outcomes. However an objective third party might characterize the GFC’s policy
autopsies along an ideological spectrum, they have become the subject of partisan
battle, culminating in sharp reversals of policy undertaken by the Trump
Administration. Republican members of Congress have contested many elements
of the causal narratives identified above. The most aggressive antifraud policy
extensions of the post-GFC period, such as Operation Choke Point, have been
particularly susceptible to critique.
The GFC presents many other opportunities to investigate patterns of post-crisis regulatory policymaking. Other consumer protection topics to be explored
through the policy shock lens include home mortgage origination and so-called
fringe lending products such as payday loans, check cashing, and pawn shops.
The domain of investor protection in the United States beckons as a terrain to
explore—not least because policy responses there reflected notably contradictory
impulses. On the one hand, the Dodd–Frank Act tightened structures of investor
protection in a host of ways. The legislation greatly expanded the enforcement
powers available to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including
enhanced investigative authority, new incentives for whistleblowers, clarification
of the SEC’s ability to sanction professionals who abet securities violations, and
heightened penalties for transgressions of administrative rules.141 Dodd–Frank
also dramatically extended antifraud authority at the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), removing the requirement that fraud cases demonstrate
intentional deception, extending prohibitions against market manipulation, and
expanding CFTC jurisdiction to include a wider range of derivative financial
instruments, such as credit default swaps.142 On the other hand, the JOBS Act,
passed by the same Congress with large bipartisan majorities, reduced disclosure

140. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1096 (countering CFPB’s “rogue agency” critiques with evidence
of its collaboration with other law enforcement “in 9 out of 11 cases with consumer relief awards in
excess of $100 million”).
141. See generally MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41503, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE IX, INVESTOR PROTECTION (2010) (outlining
major changes under Title IX and their background and purpose); Bennett Rawicki, The Dodd-Frank
Act and SEC Enforcement—The Significant Expansions and Remaining Limitations on the SEC’s
Enforcement Scope and Arsenal, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 35 (2013) (analyzing the evolution of securities law
and enforcement and impact of Dodd–Frank).
142. See Vasu B. Muthyala & Laura L. Conn, The CFTC’s New Era of Aggressive Enforcement, 13
CRIM. LITIG. 9, 9–10 (2013).
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requirements on many new initial public offerings.143 Explaining such cross-currents will likely require attention to post-crisis policy autopsies, coalition-building, and construction of political narratives that we offer in this Article, as well as
the sort of political and policy counterattacks that have constrained the activities
of the CFPB and, more understandably, brought an end to Operation Choke
Point.
The post-GFC period also offers rich possibilities for comparing American
policy responses to those in other industrialized and industrializing countries.
How did high-income countries in Europe and Asia, or emerging economies in
the Global South, make sense of the GFC’s implications for consumer protection,
investor protection, or other crisis-related issues? To what extent did legislators
and regulatory officials in these other nations follow the lead of American policymakers, or rather, chart different paths on the basis of distinctive assessment of
local conditions or by questioning American wisdom in the face of a worldwide
crisis that originated in the United States? How important were policy intermediaries such as the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development in
diffusing, or forestalling, policy ideas and strategies? Answering such queries
will depend on a collective effort from social scientists with detailed knowledge
of relevant languages and societal contexts. But the pay-off from a parallel set of
investigations would be significant, greatly improving our understanding of more
general patterns and tendencies in crisis-driven regulatory change.
CONCLUSION
Major crises usually generate a large volume of academic commentary as well
as regulatory reactions. We call for a deeper scholarly enterprise: to operationalize the study of crises and the responses that follow them, which inevitably defy
the predictions of the most elegant theories. Treating the Global Financial Crisis
as a policy shock, this Article has presented four case studies on topics and using
methods that have received short-shrift in the literature relative to other GFC
issues. We offer these studies and commentaries as a template for evaluating the
next big crisis when it comes, as it inevitably will—whether in the form of financial meltdown, environmental catastrophe, or other profound societal challenge.

143. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules
that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 169–70 (2013). See generally
Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and
Individual Investors: Evidence from the JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293 (2015).

